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We develop a basic framework to understand the organization of highly creative activities.  Management
faces a fundamental tradeoff in organizing such activities.  On the one hand, since creativity cannot
be achieved by command and control or by monetary incentives, internal/contractual production of
creative products is plagued by hazards arising from their fundamental characteristics: extremely high
input, output and market uncertainty, and the inherent informational advantages of creative talent.
 Procuring highly creative products in the market place, though, exposes the distributor to a fundamental
risk: independently produced creative goods are generic distribution-wise.  Thus, in procuring creative
products in the marketplace, distributors face the unavoidable winner's curse risk.  Since this risk is,
to a large extent, independent of the creative nature of the product, the higher the creative content,
the higher the relative hazards associated with internal or contractual production.  Thus, internal/contractual
production of creative goods will tend to be less prevalent the higher the creative content associated
with its production. We apply this insight to the evolution of the U.S. film industry in the mid-XXth
century.  We exploit two simultaneous natural experiments -- the diffusion of TV and the Paramount
antitrust decision forcing the separation of exhibitors from distributors and prohibiting the use of block-booking.
 Both events increased the demand for creative content in movies.  We develop empirical implications
which we test by analyzing in detail the decision by distributors to produce films internally or to procure
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Creativity:  the ability to make or otherwise bring into existence something new, whether 
a new solution to a problem, a new method or device, or a new artistic object or form.
1 
 
All productive activities have a creative component.  Some activities, however, have a 
higher need for creative input.  Consider, in particular, a productive activity whose output 
requires the creation of a final product whose nature must be intrinsically different than 
all previously produced products.   Artistic products are a classic example.  For a new 
theatre production to attract large audiences, it has to be substantially different from any 
other theater piece previously produced.  The same also applies to other artistic media 
such as radio shows, TV series, and movies.  Highly creative activities also abound 
outside of the arts.  Consider, for example, the myriad of new products, technologies, 
business models and ideas that originated during the dot com era and in today’s Web 2.0 
to realize that extreme creativity flourishes in business. 
Creativity, however, has serious organizational drawbacks.  For one, high level 
creativity, in contrast to humdrum work, cannot be forced or coerced.  The standard 
writers’ block syndrome, where a writer is unable to fill up a blank page, can be applied 
to software engineers, product designers, theater directors, movie producers, academics, 
consultants, or indeed any worker who is faced with an impending highly creative task.  
The fundamental organizational problem with “the block” is that it cannot be solved by 
command and control (i.e., instructing the worker what to do) or by monetary incentives 
– the two foundational principles of organizational economics.  High level creativity, in 
short, can only be fostered, it cannot be commanded.   
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Creativity also generates particular informational asymmetries between creative 
talent and management arising from the three fundamental characteristics of creative 
work initially identified by Caves (2000).  First, infinite variety, meaning that the possible 
solutions to a particular need or demand (whether a book, film, software design, etc.) are 
impossible to define ex-ante (i.e., in advance) and to count ex-post.   In other words, a 
given general task has infinite potential solutions.  Second, nobody knows, meaning that 
creative output is shroud in extreme uncertainty about its marketability. Third, art for 
art’s sake, which underscores the fact that creative talent enjoy the creative process itself. 
The interactions among these three features make highly creative work extremely 
difficult to manage. 
Consider a manager attempting to determine whether a particular creative product 
or design is the most appropriate to the problem at hand.  Given the “infinite variety” 
characteristic of creative work, management may have to undertake the creative process 
all over again, with its time and cost implications, to determine the appropriateness of the 
original outcome.   
Although creative talent may have strong opinions about the appropriateness of its 
proposed solution, and management may have serious difficulties in second guessing 
talent, in fact most movies do not get screened, most books do not sell and most new 
products fail (the “nobody knows” feature).  The “infinite variety” and “nobody knows” 
features of creative products make the finished product’s success a highly unpredictable.   
Informational asymmetries are further aggravated by the fact that creative talent 
may enjoy the creative process.   In fact, “Art for Art’s Sake,”
2 the quintessential feature 
of creative talent, may explain why, for example, so many highly creative outcomes end 
                                                 
2 See Caves (2000). Gil and Spiller 
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up failing, and why the return to artistic endeavors is below average.
3  Thus, on the job 
enjoyment, coupled with strong differences in the appraisal of the quality of creative 
output between creative talent and management, generate particular and specific 
managerial problems, making the cost of creative activities very difficult to control. 
The Hazards of Internal Creative Production  
Internal creative production is subject to particular types of hazards, which bear both 
similarities and differences to the production of humdrum goods.   
Creative Talent Hold-Up  
Creative outputs are inherently uncertain.  When a manager requests the development of 
a particular creative output such as a book, movie, or a video game, the manager cannot, 
by definition, define the output that she is actually seeking.  If the output could be defined 
to a high degree of specificity, then the manager would have already undertaken the 
creative activity itself.  Thus, the product is typically defined in very general terms,
4 and 
although management may provide some restrictions on inputs, creative talent is in a 
much better position to know what inputs are in fact required to achieve the general task.   
Given the nature of sequential production, where development costs are sunk 
early on, and subsequent improvements are needed to achieve a satisfactory outcome, 
Caves’ (2000) Ten Ton Turkey syndrome, where costs easily escape managerial control, 
appears naturally.  Since a certain amount of investment is already sunk, informational 
asymmetries place management in the position of either having to contribute new funds 
to a project or discontinue it.  Given that creative output is shroud in uncertainty about its 
                                                 
3 See, Pew Internet Report (2004), showing that while artists are more educated than the average population 
have nevertheless an annual income below average.  See, also, Dekom (2004) reporting that the average 
internal rate of return in the motion picture industry is negative (at around -5%). 
4 This is not too different from defense procurement of new weapon systems.  See Oudot (2006). The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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marketability (Caves (2000)’  “nobody knows” property of creative activities) as long as 
management’s expectations of the project’s marketability are unaffected by its 
development cost, management may often find it optimal to follow creative talent’s 
recommendations and commit additional investment to the project. 
In sum, internal production is subject to a serious hold-up hazard based upon the 
inherent informational asymmetry between talent and management, and management’s 
inability to force the creation of high quality work that will have a certain commercial 
success. The consequence is a systematic inability to keep cost tied to initially predicted 
production budgets through internal production. 
Dynamic Hazards  
Creativity transactions are also plagued with dynamic hazards, hazards that arise with the 
implementation of creative work over time.  Two fundamental features of creative work 
are at play here: infinite variety and nobody knows.  First, the creative process is, by 
definition, particular and unique (infinite variety).  Although a creative output – say a 
new video game – may be completed and released, infinite variety implies that creative 
talent may have also found a better or more interesting game concept which did not 
disclose to management, and from which she may be able to profit in later employment.  
Management, then, may be subsidizing future career opportunities of its creative talent.
5  
Second, although ex-ante the “nobody knows” feature of creative production 
applies, ex-post an actor may become identified with his or her character, and future 
attempts to exploit that character may encounter hold-up by the creative talent.  Similarly, 
                                                 
5 This is the problem of “tacit” knowledge, with its intellectual property implications. Gil and Spiller 
6 
a successful product – say a great game or movie – does not assure that a sequel will be 
equally successful.  The “nobody knows” feature applies at all times.
6  
    In sum, creative production is subject to transaction hazards quite different from 
the standard transaction cost framework.  The hazards we emphasize here are those 
associated with the fundamental features of creativity:  extremely high input, output and 
market uncertainty, and the inherent informational advantages of creative talent.  
Producing and distributing creative products require organizational adaptation to those 
hazards. 
A Basic Organizational Response:  Talent Internalization of Creative Production 
Transaction costs call for internalization
7 of production when the hazards associated with 
a transaction are hard to manage via contract (Williamson, 1979).  The transaction 
hazards discussed earlier are all associated with the production of highly creative 
products in circumstances where talent is not the residual claimant of its work – in other 
words, they are associated with the hiring of creative talent.  Depending on the level of 
creativity required, these hazards may become extreme, and may lead to serious hold-up 
problems and conflicts between creative workers and management. 
  Talent internalization, that is, making talent the residual claimant, may not be 
feasible in team production when the creative components are relatively distributed 
among talent.  For example, talent internalization in game software development with 
multiple components, where each component has to be developed by separate talent, may 
not be feasible, as the contribution of each creative individual becomes inextricably 
                                                 
6 See De Vany and Walls (1999) on the effect of movie stars on box office. 
7 By internalization of production we mean both in-house production and contracting a specific project to 
another party. This is in contrast to buying a finished creative output from a completely independent 
production process. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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interlinked with the others.  On the other hand, in activities where the creative component 
may be more highly concentrated, talent internalization may solve much of the hazards of 
creative internal production.  For example, books are written by independent writers who 
internalize to a large extent the risks of creative writing.  Musicians tend also to perform 
at risk.  Although record labels may provide long term contracts that mitigate creative 
risk, in most cases music performers bear most if not all the risk.  In contrast, orchestra 
musicians work as hired labor.  Their creativity, however, is eliminated to cater to the 
necessary output, so despite their highly skilled role, their labor is more attuned to 
humdrum rather than to creative work. 
  Talent internalization in teams, although incomplete, may still be hazard reducing 
if a major component of talent takes over the residual rights.  In this case, informational 
asymmetries between other talent providers and talent/manager are reduced, leading to 
better cost control and more on-time delivery.  Talent internalization, though, exposes 
talent to the risks associated with the infinite variety and nobody knows features of 
creative work.   
Hazards of Procuring Independently Produced Creative Products 
A distributor of creative products may find it appealing to procure its product from 
independent talent producers.  It saves the hazards of managing “Art for Art’s Sake” 
talent and pushes upstream Caves’ “Ten Ton Turkey” problem.  On the other hand, 
independently produced creative goods, while very particular and hopefully unique, are 
generic distribution-wise.  In fact, any distributor can distribute them.  Consider, for 
example, a new cookbook by a major chef.  There are multiple publishers that could 
enhance their portfolio of cookbooks with such a book.  In fact, unless there are some Gil and Spiller 
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prescient features associated with particular editors, no publisher has better information 
concerning the potential market for this book.  The “nobody knows” rule applies here as 
well.   If a publisher, however, attempts to obtain the distribution rights to that book, it 
will have to out-compete all other publishers.  The publisher who out-competes all others 
is, though, assuming same printing and distribution costs throughout the industry, the 
publisher who thinks it can sell more.  In other words, it is the most optimistic of all.  In 
fact, with many publishers competing for the book, the winning publisher is likely to 
regret obtaining it.  This is, essentially, the winner’s curse associated with a common 
values auction.
8   
Although the winner’s curse is a common occurrence in auctions for goods such 
as paintings, used cars, and wines, as long as the buyer is a final user, it is of no 
significant consequence.  The auction winner takes home a nice painting after paying a 
bit too much, but still paid below her reservation price.  Buying products for resale in 
common value auctions, however, has a different implication.  The winning buyer will 
have paid more than its competitors were willing to pay for that product.  Since each 
bidder may be thought of as being a random draw on a common information set, on 
average winning bidders in common value auctions may be unable to resell the product at 
a profit.
9 
  Distributors may develop strategies to buy creative products without falling into 
the winner’s curse.  They may refuse to participate in auctions, and may require creative 
producers to negotiate with them on a one-to-one rather than a one-to-many basis.
10  
                                                 
8 See Kagel and Levin (1986).  
9 This may explain why art merchants do not normally buy at auctions.   
10 An example of this process is visible in the Sundance Film Festival where often a private screening is 
arranged to a previously selected distributor, who is given the right to make a preemptive purchase offer. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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Distributors may also enter into a long term arrangement with independent producers of 
creative products, which limits the producers’ ability to negotiate with other 
distributors.
11  These arrangements, however, highlight the significance of the hazards of 
producing creative products internally. 
The Fundamental Managerial Trade-off in Creative Goods Production 
Management faces a fundamental trade-off in the acquisition of creative goods.  It can 
attempt to enter into internal or contractual arrangements for the production of those 
goods, but such arrangements will be subject to extreme talent informational asymmetries 
and potential hold-ups.  On the other hand, buying finished creative products for 
commercial purposes is subject to different degrees of the winner’s curse.   Since the 
winner’s curse is to a large extent independent of the creative nature of the product, the 
higher the creative content, the higher the risks associated with internal or contractual 
production.  Thus, our main organizational insight is that  
internal/contractual production of creative goods should be less prevalent than 
their outright purchase the higher the creative content associated with its 
production.  
For the remainder of this article, we apply this insight to the evolution of the U.S. film 
industry in the middle of the XXth century. 
The US Movie Industry in the 1940s and 1950s 
Movie production is the quintessential creative process. Movies have to provide 
audiences with a uniquely different experience each time, and their making is associated 
with so much creativity that virtually the only predictor of commercial success is their 
first week box office performance. Budget size, the quality of all individual inputs, and 
                                                 
11 This is the case, for example, of the relation between the Weinstein Co. and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Gil and Spiller 
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the film’s cast do not guarantee the market appeal of the final product.
12  In fact, the sum 
of the parts may be lesser, equal to or greater than the whole. Also, the sum of the same 
parts may yield very different outcomes if released at different points in time. Given the 
extreme uncertainty of demand (the “nobody knows” principle), the “infinite variety” 
prevalent in the industry, and the fact that artists in this industry are likely to be among 
the most extreme representatives of the “art for art’s sake” principle, it is surprising – 
and encouraging for the future of the industry – that we find rationality in the way the 
movie industry manages to exercise control over the production process.   
This article focuses specifically on the organizational decisions of movie 
production and distribution companies on an individual project level. Production 
companies must decide for each film whether to execute distribution in-house or 
outsource to another distributor.  Similarly, distribution companies must decide whether 
to produce in-house, co-produce (including funding), or purchase films on the open 
market.   
As discussed earlier, the higher the desired creative content of the good, the lower 
the hazards of open market acquisitions relative to internal or contractual production.  It 
is also in this sense that the movie industry serves as an interesting case study of the 
organizational implications of an increase in the required high-level creative content of its 
product.  
Until the late 1940s, the U.S. motion picture industry was dominated by the “Big 
Five” studios that integrated production, distribution, and exhibition.
13  These firms 
                                                 
12 See De Vany (2004). 
13 These were Paramount, Warner Bros., Loew’s (MGM), Twentieth Century-Fox and RKO.  To these, we 
need to add the “Little Three” (Universal, Columbia, and United Artists) to complement the set of relevant 
players (Balio, 1990). The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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directly controlled theaters accounting for 50 percent of total domestic film rentals, and 
all the theaters were required to abide by the practice of “block booking,” where films 
could only be purchased in prepackaged groups.  These “blocks” included a mixture of 
both high and low quality films, leaving theaters with little choice but to agree to 
purchase since the Big Five produced and distributed roughly three quarters of the top 
grossing “A” films (Balio 1990).  The quality of the worst of these films purchased was 
occasionally so poor that theaters simply shelved them instead of showing them to the 
public (Strick 1978).  It is widely believed that block booking helped theaters save on 
search costs and assure a constant flow of films onto their screens.
14 Similarly, 
distributors saved on bargaining costs and were able to market a range of movies that 
varied widely in quality and genre since the size of the block was also important to 
theaters. With demand from theaters guaranteed through direct control and block 
booking, motion picture production was organized under the “studio system,” resembling 
a large-scale manufacturing operation with routinized production processes (Storper and 
Christopherson 1987).     
After years of strong box office attendance, the motion picture industry began a 
rapid and dramatic decline in the post-World War II period.  Average weekly movie 
attendance declined 50% from $90 million in 1946 to $45 million in 1956 (Stuart 1982). 
This had a traumatic impact on the profits of the motion picture studios, with the 
combined profits of the ten largest production operations falling 74% from $121 million 
to $32 million during the same period (Balio 1985).  The weekly habitual moviegoers 
that the motion picture industry relied upon were disappearing, and audiences grew more 
discriminating about the films they chose to see (Wasko 1982).   
                                                 
14 See Kenney and Klein (1983). Gil and Spiller 
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There were two major external shocks that led to the downturn in the motion 
picture industry during this period.  The first was the Supreme Court ruling on U.S. vs. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc. et al in 1948 which forced the separation of exhibition from the 
production and distribution businesses owned by the Big Five.  With exhibitors now able 
to freely purchase films, independent producers began to take rental market share from 
the Big Five producer-distributors (Stuart 1982).  The ruling also banned restrictive trade 
practices such as block booking, and the added insurance such mechanisms provided to 
producers and distributors vanished with them.  Every movie produced and distributed 
would now have to be sold individually, and not at all if the quality was too poor.
15       
The second major shock was the spread of television.  Americans owned only 
14,000 television sets in 1947, but by 1954 ownership reached 32 million.  By the end of 
the 1950s, almost 90 percent of American homes owned a television set.  The marginal 
cost of viewing television was insignificant relative to a movie ticket once a set was 
purchased, and the variety and convenience provided by the new visual medium made it a 
competitive substitute for motion pictures (Balio 1985).  Confronted with the 
combination of both shocks, major producers and distributors began to face an 
increasingly competitive environment for films. 
Increased competition drove distributors in the industry to increase their demand 
for higher quality movies. This increased the demand for creativity for both in-house as 
well as independent productions.  Producers responded by increasing the amount of 
resources and creative inputs invested into the production process of hopefully higher 
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quality movies.
16  Production was refocused away from lower budget “B” films and 
concentrated instead on producing a smaller number of big budget “A” films, with 
significant investments in a variety of new technologies including color, 3-D, and 
stereophonic sound.
17   
In the following sections we specify the empirical organizational implications of 
the increased demand for creative content, describe the data used here, and conduct 
empirical tests of our hypotheses. 
Empirical Implications for Make-or-Buy Decisions in the US Movie Industry in the 
1940s and 1950s 
The testable implications follow the fundamental managerial trade-off in the production 
of creative goods stated above and rewritten here:  
“Internal/contractual production of creative goods should be less prevalent than 
their outright purchase the higher the creative content associated with its 
production.”  
We define five testable implications within the context of the movie industry in the 
middle of the XXth century and the special circumstances that we have described in the 
previous section. 
The first empirical implication is that the increase in demand for creativity should 
lead to a greater decrease in the amount of internal production for the “Paramount” 
distributors (the Big Five plus Universal, Columbia and United Artists) than for the “non-
Paramount” distributors. Even though all distributors should have decreased internal 
                                                 
16 This does not mean a change in the taste of American movie-goers over this time. The two shocks 
presented here basically mean that the demand for creativity by distribution and production companies 
increased because now they had to compete against television and each movie had to compete with all other 
movies, as they were not sold in blocks any longer. 
17 See Balio (1990), Stuart (1982) and Kindem (2000). Gil and Spiller 
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production activity, because of the increased competition from television, the distributors 
involved in the Paramount antitrust case were further affected, as their use of block 
booking as contractual practice was not allowed from 1948 on.
18  Thus, their demand for 
creativity after 1948 must have increased by more than that of other “non-Paramount” 
integrated distributors.  
A second empirical implication arises from the fact that the demand for creativity 
was also affected by theater ownership. By owning theaters, distributors were able to 
assure release of their less appealing movies even if no independent theaters demanded 
them. Therefore theater divorcement by the five integrated “Paramount” distributors (the 
Big Five) must also have decreased the proportion of internal/contractual production in 
these firms in relation to other non-forwardly integrated firms. This must hold across 
years within the group of “Paramount” distributors and when compared to other 
distributors. 
A third empirical implication arises from the volatility over time in the make-or-
buy decision.  When demand for creativity is relatively low, changes in movie portfolios 
can be adjusted mostly by internal production/contracting.  With increased demand for 
creativity, unexpected changes in the required movie portfolio must be satisfied 
opportunistically by internally producing/contracting or acquiring a movie as needed.  
Thus, with the increase in the demand for creativity, we should observe an increase in the 
volatility of make-or-buy decisions.  Thus, our third empirically testable implication is 
that increases in demand for creativity among “Paramount” distributors resulting from the 
                                                 
18 United Artists was included in the trial but never sold movies in blocks. This created controversy about 
the real goal of the case. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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block booking ban and theater divorcement must bring an increase in the volatility of 
their make/or buy decisions.  
A fourth empirical implication arises from the need to use other firms’ assets to 
produce more creative films. During the 1940s and 1950s studios utilized long-term 
contracts with their actors and actresses
19 who specialized in different genres. The 
increased demand for creative content increased the demand for assets and agents that 
were held under long-term relationships with other studios, and originated the 
collaboration of different studios in the production of a movie. Thus, our fourth empirical 
implication is that we should observe an increase in the number of co-productions 
(movies produced by more than one studio) when the demand for creativity increases and 
studios are not able to adjust their production technologies fast enough (which we argue 
is the case).
20 
Finally, we would expect that all these changes in the production process would 
have an effect on the overall quality of movies in the industry due to the reorganization of 
production and the use of more creative inputs in each individual movie. The fifth 
testable empirical implication is then that the increase in demand for creativity should, in 
fact, bring about higher quality movies. In particular, this shift should have increased the 
quality of movies produced in-house relative to the quality of movies produced by 
independent firms and distributed by integrated distributors. 
In the following section we present the data used to test these implications and 
describe the organization of the industry during the two decades under study.              
                                                 
19 See Storper and Christopherson (1987). 
20 See Spiller and Zelner (1997) for a similar analysis of joint ventures in telecommunications. Gil and Spiller 
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Data Description 
In this study we combine information from two data sets. The first data set comes from 
the American Film Institute catalog.
21 From this data set, we obtain information on movie 
length in minutes, production companies and distributors. A movie is defined as a co-
production if more than one studio takes part in the production process.  
The second information source is the IMDBPro data set.
22 From this data set we 
use information on movie characteristics such as genre, IMDB ratings, award 
nominations, and production budgets for a limited number of movies.   
In total we have information for 8126 movies that convert to 8848 movie-studio 
pairs (due to co-productions). All films in our study were released between 1940 and 
1960. These movies were distributed by approximately 300 distributors and produced by 
roughly 1250 production companies. 
As shown in Figure I, II and III below, the structure of the industry did not remain 
constant across these two decades. Figure I shows that the number of movies released 
decreased from 500 in the early 1940s to roughly 200 by the end of the 1950s. The figure 
also segments the number of movies by type of organizational form governing the 
distribution of a movie. The number of movies produced by independent studios 
(regardless of the distribution channel) was roughly constant (see blue and red lines), 
whereas the number of movies produced internally by integrated distributors decreased 
substantially and is responsible to a large extent for the wide decrease in the industry. 
 
 
                                                 
21 See http://www.afi.com/members/catalog/. 
22 See www.imdb.com. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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Figure I already provides evidence concerning the first empirical implication, as 
the number of movies produced internally by integrated distributors decreased 
substantially with the increase in creativity demand.  
Figure II provides the evidence on the number of producers by organizational 
form.  Figure II shows that the number of independent producers increased significantly 
after 1946 and peaked again after 1956. The number of integrated producers did not 
change over the two decades under study.
23 When combining the evidence from Figure I 
and Figure II, we can see that the decrease in the number of movies produced by 
integrated producers did not follow from a decline in the number of integrated producing 
companies. As Figure I shows, the overall decrease in number of movies released in the 
                                                 
23 In Figure II we define “Integrated Producers Outsourcing” as those production companies that had their 
own distributing branch and did use other companies to distribute some of their movies. Similarly, we 
define “Integrated Producers Not Outsourcing” as those producers that distribute all their movies through 
their own distributing branch. Gil and Spiller 
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industry almost perfectly matches the decrease in the number of movies produced 
internally by the integrated distributors.  
Figure II  
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Figure III 
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Finally, Figure III presents the number of distributors by organizational form.  
Figure III shows that the distribution market did not shrink either. Even though the 
number of distributors defined as “Integrated Distributors Not Outsourcing” decreased 
significantly from 10 to 2 between 1940 and 1960,
24 the number of independent 
distributors more than compensated for this decrease by increasing from 7 to 25 during 
the same period. The number of “Integrated Distributors Outsourcing” remained roughly 
constant around 10 since 1946. 
The decrease in the number of movies released and the increase in the number of 
production and distribution companies are jointly explained by the disintegration of 
dominant firms in the 1940s followed by a massive entry of independent producers 
through co-productions. The data also suggest that the increase in demand for creativity 
decreased the number of movies distributed by existing distribution companies by more 
than the decrease in the market size for movies, and thus allowed other (new 
independent) distributors to enter the market.   
Empirical Implementation 
In this section we describe the methodology we use to test for the implications outlined 
earlier. We combine regression and graphical analysis to bring evidence on the validity of 
our testable implications.   
Make-or-Buy Decisions 
The first and second testable implications state that the increase in demand for creativity 
will lower the amount of internal production, and that block booking banning and theater 
divorcement will magnify this effect. To test these implications we use a difference-on-
                                                 
24 In Figure III, we define an “Integrated Distributors Outsourcing” as a distributor that distributes movies 
of its own and movies produced by others, and “Integrated Distributors Not Outsourcing” as distributors 
who do not distribute movies produced by others. Gil and Spiller 
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differences approach where we not only compare make-or-buy decisions before and after 
the increase in demand for creativity due to the introduction of television, but also 
compare make-or-buy decisions across different types of distributors (“Paramount” and 
“non-Paramount” distributors) to test for the second implication. We estimate OLS 
regressions of the the share of internally produced movies over all movies distributed by 
distributor j in year t (VIjt) using specification (1):  
VIjt = α0 + α1*Paramountj + α2*Post_1948t + α3*Paramountj*Post_1948t + 
+ α4*Theaters?jt + δj + δt + ujt,     (1) 
where the explanatory variables are a dummy variable “Paramountj” that takes value 1 if 
distributor j is one of the eight distributors in the Paramount antitrust case and 0 if 
otherwise; a dummy variable “Post_1948t” that takes value 1 if year t is after 1948, and 0 
otherwise; the interaction of the previous two; and a dummy variable “Theaters?jt” that 
takes value 1 if distributor j owned theaters in year t, and 0 otherwise. We also add to the 
analysis distributor and year fixed effects to control for differences in unobservable 
characteristics across firms and years. 
Directly related to the first testable implication is the question of how distributors 
adjust to changes in genre popularity. They may adjust to these changes by either 
producing movies of new genres internally or by buying from independent producers, and 
these rates of adjustment may be determined by previous decisions of genre 
specialization. For this reason, we study vertical integration decisions by genre and 
distributor by estimating specification (2) such that 
VIjkt = α0 + α1*#Movieskt + α2*#Moviesjt  +    (2) 
+ α3*#Movieskt*δt +α4*#Moviesjt*δt + δjk + δt + ujkt,   The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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where now the dependent variable VIjkt  is the share of movies of genre k distributed by 
distributor j in year t that is internally produced. The two main explanatory variables are 
the total number of movies in genre k in the industry in year t #Movieskt and the total 
number of movies distributed by distributor j in year t #Moviesjt. We also include in the 
regression analysis genre-distributor and year fixed effects, as well as the interactions of 
the two main explanatory variables with year fixed effects. The total number of movies 
distributed by each distributor j in a given year t proxies for scale effects at the firm level 
and the total number of movies of genre k in year t in the industry captures changes in 
demand (popularity) across genres in different years. 
The third empirically testable implication states that an increase in demand for 
creativity will increase the volatility of make-or-buy decisions because internal 
production is no longer a low cost alternative to high cost outside movies. To study the 
evolution of the volatility of production and distribution decisions by producers and 
distributors, we compute a measure of volatility of the number of movies produced or 
distributed that can be compared across firm types and years and investigate its evolution 
from 1940 to 1960. Take, for example, the volatility of the number of movies produced 
by a production company. To compute such a measure of volatility, we first estimate 
OLS regressions using specification (3): 
Number of Moviesjt = α0 + δj + δt + ujt,  (3) 
where the dependent variable is the number of movies produced by producer j in year t 
(but in other instances will be the number of movies distributed by distributor j in year t), 
and the right-hand side of the regression equation only contains a constant and firm and 
year fixed effects. From specification (3), we obtain the residuals and the predicted Gil and Spiller 
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values of the dependent variable and create a third variable that is the result of dividing 
the estimated residual by the predicted value. We call this third variable the standardized 
residual. The standardized residual becomes an approximation of the percentage variation 
from the mean of the dependent variable that is comparable across firms and years. We 
then calculate the standard deviation per year, group of firms and decision that we are 
comparing. The standard deviation of the standardized residual is our measure of 
volatility. We repeat this same exercise for all make-or-buy decisions for integrated 
producers and integrated distributors.  
To examine the third testable implication, we create a series of volatility for 
number of movies produced by integrated and independent producers, and number of 
movies distributed by independent and integrated distributors. For integrated distributors 
only, we create a series reflecting the volatility of number of movies bought and made 
and we break these series into volatility of those distributors with theaters and those 
without. We plot these series and observe their different behavior across time. 
Co-Productions 
Our fourth testable implication is that the increased demand for creativity will increase 
the number of co-produced movies. To explore this implication we calculate the share of 
co-produced movies per organizational form (independent distributor, independent 
movie-integrated distributor, and integrated movie-integrated distributor) and plot it 
against time. 
Supply of Creativity 
The fifth testable implication states that the changes in the organization of production that 
followed the increase in demand for creativity had an effect on the use of creative inputs The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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and the supply of creative output. To test this last implication, we study the evolution of a 
few variables such as production budgets, the number of genres a movie qualifies for, 
IMDB ratings and nominations for Oscars, Golden Globes and international film 
festivals.  
More creative inputs under a period of higher demand for creativity will become 
more expensive and therefore we study the evolution of production budgets under 
different organizational forms to test whether integrated distributors reacted more to the 
increase in demand for creativity than independent distributors did. For this purpose, we 
undertake two types of analysis. We first graph the evolution of the average movie 
production budget by organizational form across time and then estimate OLS regressions 
of the product budget in US$ of movie i (Budgeti) in specification (4):  
Budgeti = α0 + α1*Post_1950?i + α2*[Indep Movie, Integ Distrib]i +  
+ α3*[Integ Movie, Integ Distrib]I + α4*[Indep Movie, Integ Distrib]i*Post_1950?i + 
+ α5*[Integ Movie, Integ Distrib]i*Post_1950?i + ui,   (4) 
where the unit of observation is a movie and the explanatory variables are a dummy 
variable “Post 1950?” that takes value 1 if movie i was released after 1950 and 0 
otherwise, a dummy variable [Indep Movie, Integ Distrib] that takes value 1 if movie i 
was distributed by an integrated distributor but produced by a different firm and 0 
otherwise, and a dummy variable [Integ Movie, Integ Distrib] that takes value 1 if movie 
i was produced and distributed by the same firm and 0 if otherwise. We also include 
interactions between the organizational form dummies and “Post 1950?”  This 
specification takes as a control group movies produced by independent producers and 
distributed by non-integrated distributors in the 1940s. Gil and Spiller 
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We also examine graphically the time series of the average number of genres per 
movie, IMDB ratings, nominations to the Oscars’ four main categories, nominations to 
best picture at the Golden Globes, and awards from the Berlin, Cannes and Venice 
international film festivals. These are movie characteristics that are proportional to movie 
complexity and movie quality. The number of genres per movie is a direct measure of 
movie complexity given the genre studio specialization commented above. IMDB ratings 
are direct measure of the audience opinion on a given movie quality. Finally, the 
nominations to different award, in the US and abroad, are a different measure of movie 
quality. 
Empirical Results  
In this section we show the results of applying the methodology described in the previous 
section. We divide the results into different subsections that illustrate the consequences of 
the increase in demand for creativity on make-or-buy decisions on levels of internal 
production, volatility, incidence of co-productions and the supply of creativity 
respectively.  
 Make-or-Buy  Decisions 
We start by testing the first and second empirical implications that posit an increase in 
creativity demand will decrease the incidence of vertical integration. The first empirical 
implication indicates that the increase in demand for creativity should decrease internal 
production more in “Paramount” distributors than in “non-Paramount” distributors. We 
test this by running OLS regressions on specification (1) below. We show the results in 
Table I below. 
 The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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TABLE I - DEP. VARIABLE: % INTERNAL PRODUCTION OF TOTAL DISTRIBUTION 
Independent Variable:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Post 1948?  -0.09  -0.05  -  -0.12  -0.19  -0.03 
  (0.03)*** (0.04)  -  (0.08)  (0.09)**  (0.10) 
Paramount Case Studio?  0.03  -  0.03  -  -  - 
  (0.07)  -  (0.07)  -  -  - 
Post 1948?*Paramount Case Studio?  0.20  0.03  0.20  0.03  -  - 
  (0.07)*** (0.04)  (0.07)*** (0.05)  -  - 
Owned Theaters?  0.52  0.26  0.49  0.21  0.22  - 
  (0.05)*** (0.04)*** (0.06)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)***  - 
Constant  0.29  0.31  0.23  0.29  0.53  0.19 
  (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)***  (0.06)*** 
Distributor FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Sample  Full  Full  Full  Full  Paramount 
No 
Paramount
Observations  764  764  764  764  165  599 
R-squared  0.19  0.86  0.22  0.87  0.94  0.84 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Results from column (1) show that all firms as a group decreased their percentage of in-
house production after 1948 by 9 percentage points. This result is a combination of the 
effect on “Paramount” and “non-Paramount” firms as can be seen in columns (5) and (6). 
The former decreased vertical integration by 19 percentage points after 1948 while the 
latter did not change their behavior much.
25 This result is consistent with the first testable 
implication.  
The second testable implication is that forward integrated theaters will decrease 
internal production after separating from their theaters. We test this by adding to the OLS 
regressions in Table I a dummy variable that equals 1 if the distributor owns theaters and 
0 otherwise. This variable varies across distributors and within distributors across time. 
Results in Table I show that forward integrated distributors distributed 20 to 50 
percentage points more of in-house production when they owned a theater branch (see 
                                                 
25  Most of the Non-Paramount firms are not integrated.  Thus, the relevant results are those in column (5). Gil and Spiller 
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columns (1) to (5)) relative to when they did not own a theater branch. These results are 
consistent with the prediction of our second testable implication.  
TABLE II - DEP. VARIABLE: % INTERNAL PRODUCTION OF TOTAL DISTRIBUTION BY GENRE 
Independent Variable:  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
No. Movies Distributed Firm/Year  0.004    0.003    0.005    0.005 
  (0.001)***   (0.001)***   (0.001)***    (0.001)***
No. Movies Genre/Year  0.001    -0.001    -0.001    -0.001
  (0.0003)***   (0.0003)**   (0.0003)*    (0.0003)
Constant  0.302    0.497    0.394    0.393 
  (0.019)***   (0.033)***   (0.043)***    (0.044)***
Genre/Firm FE  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Year FE  No    Yes    Yes    Yes 
No. Movies Genre*Year FE  No    No    No    Yes 
No. Movies Distributed*Year FE  No    No    Yes    Yes 
Observations  3526    3526    3526    3526 
R-squared  0.73    0.76    0.76    0.77 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
In Table II we show the results of estimating specification (2). This table sheds 
light on how distributors adjust make-or-buy decisions to changes in movie genre 
popularity within their chosen movie portfolio. The results indicate that bigger 
distributors are more likely to integrate more production across all genres. The results 
also show, controlling for year fixed effects, that sudden positive changes in genre 
popularity are negatively correlated with the share of in-house production (see columns 
2-4). This is consistent with the notion that distributors adjust to unexpected demand 
changes for certain genres in demand by licensing movies produced elsewhere.  
The third testable implication is that an increase in creativity demand will increase 
volatility in make-or-buy decisions.  Therefore, we study if this is the case for decisions 
in the number of movies produced and distributed for producers and distributors 
respectively, and the number of movies made and bought for integrated distributors only 
with and without theaters. We use as a measure of volatility the standard deviation of the The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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percentage deviation over the predicted value of the number of movies produced or 
distributed (depending on the case). 
Figure IV 








































Figure IV above shows the evolution of the volatility of the number of movies 
produced between 1940 and 1960 for integrated (with a distribution branch) and 
independent producers (without a distribution branch). The graph shows that decisions of 
integrated producers are more volatile than decisions of independent producers during the 
whole period.  This higher volatility is the result of integrated producers’ ability to use 
internal production as an adjustment margin to available external production. We also 
observe that the volatility of decisions of both types increased substantially in the late 
1950s as we predicted. 
Figure V below compares the volatility in the number of movies distributed by 
independent and integrated distributors.  Gil and Spiller 
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Figure V 


















































































































This figure shows that the volatility of integrated distributors is consistently higher than 
that of independent distributors, and that the gap between the two increased from 1955 to 
1960. There is also an increase in the volatility of integrated distributors that may be due 
to the increase in demand for creativity and its organizational implications as described 
above. 
Since Table II suggests that firms adjust their internal production to changes in 
genre popularity, we hypothesize that the observed increases in volatility could come 
from unexpected changes in genre popularity. For this reason, we repeat the exercise in 
specification (3) adding a genre fixed effect.  Thus, the left-hand side variable represents 
a measure of volatility that controls for genre composition.   Figure VI plots this volatility 
series. Figure VI shows that the volatility of the number of movies distributed by 
independent and integrated distributors is low and equal across distributor types until the The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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early 1950s. The volatility of both increased equally in the 1950s.  The contrasting 
evidence in Figure V and Figure VI indicates that independent and integrated distributors 
adjust equally within genres, but integrated distributors have an easier time adjusting 
across genres, explaining why the volatility of the number of movies distributed overall 
by integrated distributors is higher than that of independent distributors. 
Figure VI 




















































     
We can also analyze, for integrated distributors, the volatility of the number of 
movies made versus the volatility of the number of movies bought. Figure VII below 
shows that during the 1940s the volatility of movies distributed was due primarily to the 
number of movies bought. As the demand for creativity increased, the volatility of 
movies bought decreased drastically, while the volatility of movies made increased, 
suggesting that the margin of adjustment shifted from outsourcing to in-house production.  
 Gil and Spiller 
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Figure VII 
Volatility of Make vs Buy 







































As in the previous case, we compute the volatility of movies made and movies 
bought controlling for genre (Figure VIII below) and observe that, controlling for genre, 
the volatility of movies made increased from 1953 on.
26 Figure VIII, when compared to 
Figure VII, suggests that integrated distributors not only adjust their movie portfolio 
across make-or-buy decisions but also across decisions on what genres to market. 
 
                                                 
26 There was a volatility spike in 1948, but the sustained increased took place in the 1950s. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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Figure VIII 
Volatility of Make vs Buy Controlling by Genre 









































Next we examine differences in volatility in make-or-buy decisions between 
integrated distributors that were forward integrated into exhibition in the early 1940s and 
integrated distributors that were never integrated into exhibition in our sample.  We do 
this because owning theaters allowed these distributors to assure release of many of their 
movies that may not have found an alternative outlet. We show volatility series of both 
distributor types in Figure IX. Gil and Spiller 
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Figure IX 






































Movies Bought, No Theaters




Figure IX above suggests that the volatility of movies made and bought for 
distributors with theaters was lower than for those that owned no theaters. It is also 
notable that these four series converge to the same levels since the owners of theaters 
were forced to separate from their exhibition branches as part of the 1948 Supreme Court 
resolution in the Paramount antitrust case. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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Figure X 







































Movies Bought, No Theater




Finally, we analyze the volatility of movies made and bought for integrated 
distributors with and without theaters controlling by genre. We show the volatility series 
in Figure X above. We observe that the volatility of movies made and movies bought 
across distributors with and without theaters is the same. This evidence combined with 
the evidence in the previous figure (without controlling for genre) suggests that 
distributors with theaters adjust better across genres than distributors without theaters.  
 Co-Productions 
The fourth testable implication states that an increase in demand for creativity will lead to 
an increase in the incidence of co-productions. Co-productions allow firms not only to 
share production costs but also share ideas and skills that eventually turn into more 
creative movies. The increase in co-productions at the end of the 1940s and throughout 
the 1950s was the first step towards the production process that takes place currently, 
where separate inputs are added together for the making of a movie and disintegrated Gil and Spiller 
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afterwards. During the 1940s, assets (actors, studios, script writers, etc) still belonged to 
studios, so co-production was the most flexible way to combine different assets for 
different movies. 
Figure XI below depicts two regularities. The first regularity is that the percentage 
of co-productions increased substantially after 1950 and increased under all 
organizational forms. The second regularity is that even though the series of co-
production of independent movies distributed by integrated distributors is more volatile 
than the other two series before and after 1950, all three series appear to have become 
more volatile after 1950. 
Figure XI 
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Both regularities are consistent with the fourth testable implication that an 
increase in the demand for creativity (roughly after 1950) led to an increase in the 
number of co-productions. Integrated distributors co-produced more movies and 
distributed more co-produced independent movies. The general increase in demand for The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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creativity also increased the number of movies co-produced by independent producers 
and distributed by independent distributors. 
  Supply of Creativity 
The fifth empirical implication states that the reorganization of production due to the 
increase in the demand for creativity will have an effect on the use of creative inputs and 
the supply of creative output. In particular, we expect to observe changes in production 
costs (more creative inputs are more rare and therefore more expensive), the number of 
genres per movie as a way to measure movie complexity and creativity, and award 
nomination and IMDB ratings as a way to measure for movie quality. 
We start the analysis by examining time series of production budgets in Figure 
XII. We have production budget information for a selected sample of 518 movies from 
IMDB. Figure XII shows the evolution of average movie production costs in our sample. 
We observe that costs across organizational forms are very similar during the whole 
sample period. Also, costs of independently distributed movies were consistently lower 
than costs of movies distributed by integrated distributors during the 1950s. Gil and Spiller 
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Figure XII 
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Next, we show in Table III the results of estimating specification (4). Column (1) 
shows, not surprisingly, that movies in our sample were on average more expensive to 
produce during the 1950s than in the 1940s. This increase is probably caused by both the 
increase in demand for creativity and the inflation during those years. Column (2) also 
shows that movies produced by an integrated distributor are generally more expensive 
than movies produced by independent producers. Finally, column (3) that movies 
distributed by integrated distributors (produced in-house or outsourced) were the primary 
driver of production budget growth during these two decades, reflecting the tendency 
towards higher quality required from those distributors.
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These findings are consistent with our fifth testable implication.  Because of the 
increase in demand for creativity, studios demanded more creative inputs that were more 
                                                 
27 Our results also show that independently produced movies distributed by integrated distributors cost less 
to produce than movies distributed by independent distributors and less that those movies produced and 
distributed by integrated studios. These results are at odds with Robins (1993). In his paper, Robins finds 
that in the case of Warner Brothers films produced by independent producers actually cost more than those 
produced in-house. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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expensive, and therefore spent more per movie production during the 1950s. The budgets 
in in-house productions increased and independently produced movies distributed by 
integrated studios cost more. 
TABLE III - DEP. VARIABLE: PRODUCTION BUDGET PER MOVIE  
Independent Variable:  (1)    (2)    (3) 
After 1950?  335885    421831    -499184 
  (155987)**   (163643)**   (362892) 
Indep Movie, Integ Distrib      385458    -653877 
      (243611)    (325976)**
Integ Movie, Integ Distrib      547535    -202202 
      (223259)**   (313996) 
After 1950?*[Indep Movie, Integ Distrib]          1429270
          (449029)***
After 1950?*[Integ Movie, Integ Distrib]          1066280
          (431328)**
Constant  1425680   1009150   1685960
  (94611.9)***   (209695)***   (291322)***
           
Observations  518    518    518 
R-squared  0.01    0.02    0.04 
           
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
We can also examine other creative dimensions of movies such as the number of 
genres per movie, and nominations for Oscars and other awards.
 28 The number of genres 
that a movie is categorized into is a good measure of movie creativity since studios 
specialized in the production of specific genres in the 1940s (see Chisholm (1993)), and 
therefore producing a movie that qualified for other genres involved the use of new and 
existing assets and expertise in novel ways.  
                                                 
28 The IMDB movie ratings can be seen as another measure of creativity. These ratings range between 0 
and 10, and are self-reported. However, because they are self-reported, they engender two major 
weaknesses. First, there is no rating for a considerable number of movies, possibly because these movies 
are of poor quality or because they are older and current raters are not aware of them. Also, older movies 
from independent distributors may be less commercialized than those of integrated distributors that have 
survived over the years, which may affect ratings in a way completely unrelated to movie quality. For these 
reasons we decided not to report these results here.  Results are available upon request.  Gil and Spiller 
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We have genre data for our full sample of over 8000 movies.  Thus, in Figure XIII 
we use the full sample of movies.  Figure XIII shows that the average number of genres 
per movie increased from the 1940s to the 1950s.
29  
Figure XIII 
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Finally, we analyze the differential extent of award nominations by organizational 
form. We present results in two separate figures.  
                                                 
29 Figure XIII does not show a difference of number of genres per movie across governance structures 
during the time period under study. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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Figure XIV 
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Figure XIV shows the percentage of movies with an Oscar nomination by 
organizational form (the Oscar nominations considered here are Best Picture, Best 
Director, Best Actor and Best Actress). Note that independent movies and movies 
produced and distributed by integrated distributors exchanged relative positions in 
consecutive years up to 1947. After 1947, “integrated” movies did consistently better 
than independently distributed movies with the exception of 1960. The “success” rate of 
independent movies distributed by integrated firms is the most volatile of the three series 
and goes from 0 nominations to the top number of nominations in consecutive years. 
In Figure XV we add to the Oscar nominations the number of nominations for best movie 
in a series of other award ceremonies and international film festivals (Golden Globe, Gil and Spiller 
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Berlin, Cannes and Venice).
30 These other awards were created during the period of time 
under study, which explains the series’ increase in the late 1950s for all three 
organizational forms. Despite this limitation, we are still able to observe how movies 
under different organizational forms perform relative to each other. 
Figure XV 
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As in Figure XIV, even after the introduction of new award nominations and 
international film festivals which may have included other criteria and maintained greater 
independence from the power circles in Hollywood, the success rates of “integrated” 
movies are higher than that of independent movies during the 1950s. In this figure, even 
the success rate of independent movies distributed by integrated distributors is 
                                                 
30 It is important to show how nominations on other award ceremonies evolved because Oscar nominations 
may have been driven by circles of power in Hollywood. Foreign film festivals are independent of this and 
are more likely to nominate films only for their artistic value and not connections. The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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In this paper we investigate the organizational implications of creativity. Among all the 
issues that organizations need to deal with when managing creative inputs, we 
concentrate on make-or-buy decisions. The perils of outsourcing for distributors arise 
from the unavoidability of the winner’s curse in an environment in which distributors are 
undifferentiated and the nobody knows principle operates equally across the board. We 
compared this to the hazards of internal production where control over production 
processes and costs may be drastically hindered when managing increasingly more 
creativity-intense goods. Thus, when the demand for creativity is low internal production 
becomes relatively more attractive, while when the demand for creative content is high, 
the gap between both options narrows. 
Since we seldom find scenarios where an increase in demand for creative content 
is visible and measurable, this is a difficult empirical prediction to test.  In this paper, we 
use data from the US motion picture industry during the 1940s and 1950s where, due to 
two simultaneous shocks (the introduction of television and judicially imposed changes 
in the contractual structure of the industry), the demand for creative content increased. 
We find that the number and percentage of movies produced in-house declined 
significantly during this period. Also consistent with the organizational implications that 
we derive, we show that the volatility of make-or-buy decisions increased during the 
1950s relative to the 1940s. We show that part of the difference in volatility between Gil and Spiller 
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independent and integrated distributors is explained by the ability of integrated 
distributors to adjust within and across genres due to changes in genre popularity, as well 
as changes in overall demand for creativity. We are also able to document an increase in 
the number of co-productions that took place from 1950 onward and argue this was 
another method to increase the use of creative inputs into the production process. Finally, 
we look at outcomes of creative outputs and show that these changes in the organization 
of production had consequences on production budgets, the number of genres per movie, 
award nominations, and IMDB ratings. 
Although we show patterns in the data that demonstrate that increases in demand 
for creativity had major consequences on the way the industry organized production, we 
cannot easily identify which of the two major shocks drove which changes. Future work 
should address and differentiate the effect of the introduction of television from the effect 
of changes in contractual practices on organizational decisions. Similarly, we focused 
primarily on make-or-buy decisions and co-productions, but organizations have many 
other dimensions that creativity is likely to have organizational implications for. 
Examples include pay for creativity or authority and decision delegation in the presence 
of creativity within an organization. These are all topics for future creative research. 
 The Organizational Implications of Creativity 
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